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Executive Summary
This project examines the impact of the growing Islamic public in Western democracies,
namely in the context of third-party arbitration courts based on Shari'a law. The project
examines the controversies surrounding the introduction of Shari'a law into Western legal
systems through the non-territorial federalism of arbitration courts.
The research also analyzes reactions to Shari'a in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, and local backlash against the presence of Shari'a in Western legal systems
within the arbitrational context. To this end, the research takes into consideration political
attitudes towards the Shari'a arbitration systems in each of the three countries, organized
opposition to their presence, legislative attempts to limit or regulate their operation in the
three countries, and the impact, if any, this has on the continued operation of Shari'a
arbitration courts in Western democratic traditions in general. In determining the long-term
prospects of the limited role of Shari'a law in Western legal traditions, the case study of each
other three Western nations takes into account attempted regulatory measures, successful
bans of Shari'a arbitration where they exist, key legislation related to arbitration rights in the
countries concerned, court cases and caselaw impacting the right of Shari'a courts to operate
in these legal contexts.
Likewise, in order to offer an in-depth examination of the practice of Shari'a law and its
interaction with democratic conceptions of law, it is necessary to understand the linguistic and
etymological background of key terms pertaining to the Shari'a tradition. This will aid in
providing a basis for understanding the fundamental philosophical substructure underlying
1

the widely varied conceptions of Shari'a thought. This project will also review literature
relevant to the question of Shari'a law's relationship to liberal culture, including the
commentary of contemporary academic experts on religious freedom, contemporary Muslim
thinkers, and liberal Islamic thinkers from history, both to examine reactions, attitudes, and
analysis of Shari'a as a philosophical tradition, and to offer examples of liberal Islamic thought
to contrast the dogmatic and dictatorial stereotypes surrounding the practice of Shari'a law.
The project will also examine the practice of Shari'a law in modern and historical
contexts to emphasize the importance of the prevailing political context that the tradition
exists within, and will make the case that it is the prevailing political culture that determines
whether or not the religious practice will take a moderate or fundamentalist form. This is a
crucial question in the debate over whether or not Shari'a arbitration courts are compatible
with democratic principles of justice. It will advance the argument that, in a liberal democratic
society free of the influence of a radical political context, the practice of Shari'a will likewise
reflect those liberal values.
The project will examine the relationship between Shari'a and arbitration courts in the
Western democracies where they exist, taking into consideration caselaw, key legislative acts
pertaining to arbitration, and the current state of political affairs in those societies. Due to the
current dynamics of arbitration-court legislation, Supreme Court rulings, and related political
considerations, this project will advance the case that Shari'a arbitration courts present no
contradiction to democratic values or conceptions of justice.

2

Key Terms Pertaining to Shari'a
In order to more comprehensively understand the basis of the Shari'a tradition, it is
necessary to understand key terms pertaining to Shari'a. The word Shari'a itself is laden with a
wealth of meaning, and conveys the concept of a path to water, with the idea of a path
representing the right and pure direction for a member of the Muslim faith to follow, and
denotes the idea of cleanliness in religion and personal conduct, evoking the cleansing
properties of water.1 Terms also fundamental to understanding Shari'a are the sources from
which it is chiefly derived, namely the Holy Qur'an, and the Sunnah. The Holy Qur'an is the
central sacred text of Islam, and its etymological meaning conveys the idea of a “recitation,”
emphasizing that the Prophet was reciting the words of God. The Sunnah which means
“habitual practice” details the life, teachings, and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. Another
key term is fiqh, which means “comprehension” or “understanding,” and is used to describe
the rulings of Islamic scholars (mufti) on a given question regarding the Holy Qur'an or
Sunnah. It is these rulings which offer the basis for local understandings of Shari'a. Critical
debate between mufti on the best understating of Islamic law to be derived from these
sources is responsible for producing the wide variety of forms that Shari'a can take, and is
known as ijtihad (“effort”). These debates can become contentious, and even lead one mufti to
accuse another of takfir (heresy or apostasy), though the tradition of ijtihad, when not
impacted by prevailing political forces, tends to offer a certain latitude of thought within
Islamic scholarship. Finally, siyasa (“governance”) forms the political side of any Shari'a legal
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system, and is meant to offer Muslims a just and moral system in which to live. However, the
definition of this term, in many contexts, is flexible enough to be true in many different kinds
of government.
Introduction
In recent decades, increased communication technologies and improved transportation
infrastructure have united different regions of the globe to a degree never previously seen.
With these advances have come new opportunities in international commerce, diplomacy, and
intellectual discourse. Likewise, increased interchange between different areas of the world in
the form of immigration has led to the commingling of cultural spheres that were previously
separated by geography. One of the most significant impacts of this new interconnectivity in
Europe and North America is the introduction of a significant number of new residents of
Islamic background, who possess cultural perspectives that are in some way unique from
those of the majority of the populace in those countries. Western legal systems developed
during the Enlightenment, which have traditionally separated religious doctrine from law and
public policy, are faced with a new set of circumstances whereby some residents of Islamic
background elect to solve civil disputes according to the principles of their faith rather than
the conventional procedures of civil law. While some members of the Islamic communities of
Western nations such as the United States and United Kingdom have recoursed to informal
Shari'a religious courts for some time, some Western nations have taken steps to formalize
supervised Shari'a councils as recognized legal arbitration courts whose rulings may be
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enforced by the standard justice system.2 Predictably, this has caused controversy in some
circles, as some members of the public have raised concerns about the implications of faithbased arbitration systems being integrated into standard legal practice.
This project examines the growth of Islamic faith-based arbitration courts, the debate
over their formalization, and the reaction of the public towards those Shari'a arbitration
courts, in an effort to determine whether or not the issue has contributed to a broadly
negative backlash against the Islamic communities residing within the Western countries
where this debate is currently occurring, namely Britain, Canada, and the United States. This
project also attempts to determine whether or not Shari'a law and courts are in fact
compatible with the traditional conventional legal practices in these countries, which tend to
eschew spirituality from their deliberations in favor of established law or precedent. In order to
understand all facets of the complex relationship between Islam and democraticconstitutional law, both in the context of domestic Shari'a arbitration courts and in the arena
of international politics, it will be necessary to examine not only the activities of the Shari'a
arbitration courts in Western nations, but the historical factors impacting the development of,
and attitudes towards liberal thought in the Islamic world. Finally, it will be necessary to
analyze the relationship between perspectives of Islamic theology and liberal values such as
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and equal protection of the law. Through these means
it will be determined that while Islamic third-party arbitration courts may present an
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intimidating problem for some observers in the West, and their future is for that reason
uncertain, there is nothing necessarily contradictory between democratic principles and the
practice of government-monitored third-party religious arbitration courts based on certain
understandings of Shari'a law.
The relationship between law and religious tradition in the traditionally-defined
Western world, has, since at least the time of the Enlightenment, been one of mutual wariness,
as jurists have fiercely debated the definition and limits of religious freedom, and viewed with
skepticism the interactions between religion and government, particularly when that
interaction involves the encroachment of religious ideology within secular law and the
interference of secular law with religious liberties. Since the social and legal upheavals of the
Enlightenment, the question of whether religion should play an explicit role in legal
procedures has been largely regarded as settled, as most Western nations have adopted
either formal or informal concepts of the separation between church and state. This
separation ranges from Thomas Jefferson's “wall of separation” enshrined in American political
thought, to the principle of Laïcité (government secularism and religious neutrality) 3
considered integral to French law.
Given this longstanding legacy in Western democracies of mutually exclusive
coexistence between religious doctrine and public laws of the state, the impact that modern
transportation and communications technologies have had on the resurgence of the debate
over the appropriate limits of interaction between religion and law arguably represents one of
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the most unexpected developments of the 21st century, as hitherto the general trend has seen
religion taking an increasingly less significant role in society and civil governance, let alone
legal procedure. However, the increased interaction between the traditionally-defined West
and the Islamic World has led to precisely that circumstance.
Likewise, the influx of immigrants from traditionally Islamic nations devoid of the
overriding cultural heritage of secular legal thought has led specifically to demands that
citizens of Islamic background be allowed to rely on Islamic law and customs rather than the
secular laws and customs of their adopted countries. While other religious groups within these
nations, such as Catholics and Jews, have long-standing arbitration courts of a similar nature,
some observers and activists feel that the unique aspects of Shari'a law merit increased
regulations on all such religious tribunals; in short, the Shari'a courts having typically been the
focal point of activist campaigns against such faith-based arbitration courts.
I: Shari'a and Democratic Thought
(i.) Literature Review
In the face of timely debates denouncing and defending Islamic legal traditions, Islamic
affairs specialist Eric Chaumont of France’s National Center for Scientific Research notes that,
in regards to what Shari'a law actually is, “There are a lot of misunderstandings right
now...Sharia is literally the way, that is, the law, that God revealed in the Koran and which is
binding on all Muslims. The ambiguity is that Sharia has never been implemented anywhere in
the world. What is implemented are different interpretations of Sharia – what are called
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Muslim laws, el-Fiqh – interpretations of the law which are strict to varying degrees.” 4
Chaumont furthermore notes that because of the highly subjective and contextual nature of
Shari'a law, a legal system claiming to use Shari'a law as a source or inspiration need not
adhere to any existing models or prior religious interpretations of it. In contrast to certain
heavily theocratic-leaning states which claim to derive legal legitimacy from Shari'a law, other
interpretations allow for the full interpretation of Western forms of law, which some Muslim
scholars interpret as legitimate approximations of Shari'a. In such situations, secular forms of
law are granted religious legitimacy under more liberal interpretations of Shari'a law,
demonstrating that certain forms of Shari'a could arguably coexist with a democratic
constitutional system of law. Chaumont cites the example of Egypt, which, since President
Anwar Sadat's regime of the 1970s, has claimed Shari'a as an important inspiration for its
policies, with Sadat's regime later escalating the claim by asserting that it was the regime's
only source of law. But, as Chaumont notes, “In reality, statutory law itself was not affected and
the law implemented in Egypt today remains a law that is inspired by the French civil code,
established under Napoleon.” 5 Based on this dynamic, Caumont demonstrates that Shari'a law
need not be held as mutually exclusive with more conventionally “secular” forms of civil law,
given the highly elastic nature of what constitutes Shari'a law in the first place.
Michael Curtis of the Gatestone International Policy Institute, a non-profit political
think-tank based in New York, raises fears that the faith-based courts in Western Democracies
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will increase the influence of “Islamic extremists,” and asserts that these courts present “a
challenge” to legal practice, by “the influence of religion in society, by differences over social
issues such as women's rights, marriage, and divorce, and by the trend towards a legal system
for Muslims, separate from the rest of the population.” 6 In contrast, religious freedom and
arbitration expert Dr. Michael Hefland, in an interview with Russia Today, argues that these
fears are misplaced, noting that alternate forms of arbitration have worked “quite well” in the
United States. at resolving excess disputes, alleviating stress on the court systems. Likewise,
Hefland notes that Islamic arbitration systems have existed “for quite some time” informally
along with many other forms of arbitration, without the projected problems or significant
controversy. Furthermore, he notes that religious arbitration courts in the United States are
required to abide by the standards set by U.S. law, and that in general such courts have
cooperated with those standards. “In order to have your awards enforced you have to satisfy
our minimum standards for certain types of well-being, conduct, and a variety of other things,
and that means religious tribunals of all different types know what the ground rules are. And
they embrace the ground rules and in turn what you get is arbitrational awards that work
quite well in the American legal system.” Like Chaumont, Hefland predicts that such systems
will typically conform to the larger court system of their host nation rather than influence it in
a meaningful way.
Legal expert Dr. Almas Khan, writing for the Chicago Journal of International Law, notes
that a formalized Shari'a arbitration system would offer certain benefits for new citizens of
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Islamic background, namely a familiar form of law for recent Muslim immigrants “not
acclimated to the secular court system and thus wary of it... formalized shariah tribunals would
offer the best of both worlds---Islamic law with limited state monitoring. Muslim newcomers
would also be more readily integrated...if they believed that their voice was represented in the
formulation of laws.”7 In the arena of American political discourse, too, the issue of Shari'a
court systems, and more generally the perceived influence of “Islamists” upon local laws, has
inspired fiery rhetoric as some observers frame the issue as one of religious freedom and
equality, while others regard any legitimization of Islamic law as fundamentally polemical to
American values. Republican Senate hopeful Sharron Angle epitomized one extreme end of
this spectrum, asserting that certain towns in the United States with a high density of Muslim
citizens were in danger of becoming theocratic---and that “Frankford, Texas, and Dearborn,
Michigan, were both subject to a sharia regime, as a result of the 'militant terrorist situation'
that existed in those places.”8 In the United Kingdom, public protests against the perceived
imposition of Shari'a law on British soil have garnered the support of both nationalists groups
such as the English Defense League, and self-described “moderate” Muslims under the banner
of the One Law for All organization.9 Other British Muslim organizations have publicly
demonstrated in favor of the Shari'a arbitration courts, contending that there is nothing
inherently immoderate about the forms of Shari'a practiced in the West.10 Proponents of the
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Shari'a courts in the United Kingdom point out that under the Arbitration Act of 1996,
alternative forms of dispute resolution are both legal and enforceable under higher law---and
that there is no precedent for excluding Shari'a courts so long as all aggrieved parties agree to
abide by its rulings, and the rulings do not violate British law.11
While scholarly theories of Islamic law prevailing within repressive autocratic regimes
tend to prop up the political status quo, those interpretations originating from outside the
sphere of influence of such regimes are extremely varied in terms of their political leanings
and implications. In the context of Western constitutional democracies, scholarly
interpretations of Islamic law display a greater variety than is common in many areas of the
Islamic world, with some heavily right wing scholars endorsing militaristic and repressive
versions of Islamic teaching commonly seen in repressive regimes, and others favoring a more
moderate and liberal approach that seeks to reconcile democratic principles with those of the
Islamic faith. The former view is epitomized in the person of British Imam Abu Hamza al-Masri,
an Islamic activist and mufti notorious for endorsing the extremist position of Shari'a
scholarship. Al-masri leads the extremist Muslim activist organization Supporters of Shari'a,12
and has repeatedly stretched the limits of freedom of speech by preaching that true Shari'a
must incorporate antisemitism. His supportive statements towards terrorist attacks led to calls
for his deportation from the UK, and he was ultimately arrested for soliciting the murders of
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non-Muslims, and passing information to a suspected terrorist operative to aid in a planned
attack. Subsequently, after evidence emerged the Al-Masr had been involved in a number of
terrorist activities on American soil, including attempted recruitment and training, he was
extradited to the United States, convicted, and is currently serving a life sentence in a New
York correctional facility.13
On the other end of the spectrum of Shari'a law interpretation is Turkish-born American
mufti Fethulah Gülen, who offers an alternative interpretation of Shari'a, based on more
moderate readings of Islamic religious texts. Drawing on Quranic passages speaking of the
absolute necessity of permitting individuals to have freedom from compulsion to follow a
given religion, Gülen argues that Shari'a binds Muslims to respect the concept of religious
freedom.14 In stark contrast to the more narrow and dogmatic readings offered by
fundamentalists like al-Masri, Gülen and his fellow moderates argue that the majority of
Islamic principles can in fact be reconciled with democratic principles and Western law. In fact.
Gülen states that “95% percent of Islamic teachings” can be reconciled with Western
principles, and that the “remaining 5% are not worth fighting for,” being nonessential to the
practice of the Islamic faith.15 Indeed, the comparison between different ideological camps of
mufti as regards the proper interpretation and execution of Shari'a in the context of Western
nations reveals a divide on many fundamental issues, including women’s rights, political
secularism, and attitudes towards armed religious warfare, with the views endorsed by
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mainstream and moderate mufti more frequently resembling the views of the wider public of
the country in which they reside in. In contrast, fundamentalist mufti such as al-Masr typically
make no argument that their conception of Shari'a is reconcilable with, or should be
reconciled with, the democratic principles prevailing in the West.
Another significant aspect of Shari'a practice in the West is the fact that the ideological
conflict between moderate and fundamentalist mufti is even taking place. The greater
freedom afforded by liberal principles of free speech has rekindled a long-dormant legalistic
debate within the Muslim community over the fundamental nature of what role Shari'a should
play in the civic lives of Muslims, in a manner that has been all but stifled in many regions of
the traditionally-defined Islamic world. Unlike many of their counterparts living under
monarchies and autocracies in the traditional Islamic world, mufti residing in Western
democracies do not feel obliged to adhere to a specific religious narrative tailored to bolster
the legitimacy of a regime.
While debating the nature of Shari'a and the proper interpretation of religious texts
with respect to political and social rights can result in a literal death sentence for religious
scholars within nations such as Saudi Arabia, the principles of government religious neutrality
and free expression prevailing in many Western nations have resulted in something of a
Renaissance for the tradition of political dialogue and debate within Islam. This tradition,
known as ijtihād, holds that religious and legal principles such as Shari'a must be subject to
independent critical reasoning, and the religious and legal theories there derived must
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likewise be subject to debate within the Islamic community.16 Because theological debate and
dispute could threaten the theologically-derived legitimacy that many Islamic regimes seek to
establish through the rulings of government-backed mufti, this tradition has long been absent
from the practical day-to-day religious life of many modern Muslims. Regimes such as Saudi
Arabia, as was seen in the mass-execution of early 2016, do not tolerate either political or
religious principals out of line with those set by the regime, with “heresy” and “religious
unorthodoxy” being grounds for prosecution if a religious leader is deemed to pose a
significant threat to the ideology of the government.
Speaking for the moderate ideological wing of the community of Western mufti,
Fethulah Gülen argues that democratic societies do indeed offer Islam more protections than
even an allegedly Islamic autocracy, and that Islam, in turn, presents no fundamental
contradiction or threat to the principles of those democracies.
In fact in a democratic society, the source of law is colorblind and free from
ethnic prejudice. It promotes the...participation of individuals and society in
decision making institutions ... Everybody should be allowed to express
themselves... Also, members of minority communities should be allowed to live
according to their beliefs. If these sorts of legislations are made within the
norms of international law and international agreements, Islam will have no
objection to any of these. No one can ignore the universal values that the Qur’an
and the Sunnah have presented with regard to the rights mentioned above.
Therefore, it is impossible to prove in any way that Islam opposes democracy.17
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Paradoxically, therefore, some aspects and traditions of Islamic faith are more freely practiced
outside the sphere of influence of self-described Islamic governments. For Islamic thinkers
such Gülen, democratic nations where religious rights are protected under the auspices of
constitutionally-assured religious freedom offer the opportunity for a more free and personal
practice of Islam than is possible in many autocracies claiming to represent Islamic principles.
In some countries, notably the United Kingdom, there has been an increasing reliance
in the Muslim community on a relatively extensive system of alternate arbitration courts
operating under the standards of Shari'a law; under the Arbitration Act of 1996, the rulings of
these courts can be enforced by the standard court system, including the High Court of
Justice, the United Kingdom's equivalent of the United States Supreme Court. 18 This has led,
understandably, to mixed reactions within Western nations with growing populations of
Muslim citizens. in the debate over the government formalization of Shari'a law, the Islamic
community has been subject to frequent accusations that it is attempting to illegitimately
import foreign cultural customs into the framework of Western law. Some observers have
raised fears about the practice of polygamy among some members of the Islamic community,
arguing that these marriages19 are not recognized by legal authorities and may leave women
without full legal rights in the event of a divorce.20 Shari'a courts, and Shari'a customs in
general, these commentators argue, are components of this culture of inequality, and must
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therefore not be permitted equal status under the laws of Western countries. However, on the
issue of polygamy, some Muslim commentators retort that the prevalence of illicit
polygamous unions within the Western Islamic community is overstated, arguing instead that
the prevalence of unregistered marriages among the Muslim community stems from unequal
treatment regarding matrimonial registration. Writing for The Telegraph newspaper, journalist
Myriam Francois-Cerrah notes this discrepancy: “While Christian couples who marry in a
church, or Jewish couples who marry in a synagogue find their marriages automatically
recognized under UK law, Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and other religious groups are not afforded
the same recognition, requiring them to undertake a separate, civil ceremony.” 21
Another particularly contentious aspect of the debate is the fact that Shari'a courts
have decided sensitive issues such as domestic disputes and domestic abuse cases. Such
observers argue that arbitration tribunals based on the principles of Shari'a law are inherently
weighed against women; they point to specific cases where Shari'a law arbitration courts have
addressed domestic abuse by obliging the offending party to take anger management
courses.22 Muslim Lawyer Sheikh Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi, a chief proponent and organizer of
Shari'a Courts in Britain, counters that such Shari'a rulings, far from disenfranchising women,
are designed to repair dysfunctional marriages and oblige abusive husbands to amend their
behavior without dissolving the family.23 Inayat Bunglawala of Muslim Council of Britain notes
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that the movement against the implementation of Shari'a arbitration courts on these grounds
is relatively unique; Jewish arbitration tribunals, known as Beth Din Courts, have operated in
the United Kingdom for over a century, rendering decisions on family law and other forms of
civil dispute according to the principals of Jewish theology.24 All such courts, Bunglawala
concludes, are further protected in Britain under the Arbitration Act of 1996. This rationale
could likewise be extended to the practice of Shari'a law arbitration in other Western nations,
notably the United States, which also enforces the rulings of arbitration courts under the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925. 25 Within the United States, both Christian and Jewish
arbitration courts have been a long-term part of the legal landscape.
While the United States and other Western nations are, due to government-sanctioned
arbitration courts, seeing a rise in non-territorial entities, it is worth noting that Shari'a law
itself is in fact designed to operate within a partially non-territorial federal system, where a
pluralistic arrangement of the secular national government and non-territorial religious
schools of thought offer two parallel forms of legal guidance. From the perspective of
traditional Islamic modes of governance, a kind of non-territorial federalism between secular
and religious law is fundamental to a well-functioning society. This form of legal pluralism
divides law into two distinct realms, that of secular law, known as Siyasa, and religious rulings,
known as fiqh. Islamic legal scholar Asifa Quraishi-Landes of the University of Wisconsin
describes the system in detail: “Fiqh sets out rules and guidelines for living a good Muslim life,
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based on interpretations of Muslim scripture (the Quran and the life of the Prophet
Muhammad) by religious legal scholars...Siyasa is a very different animal. It is not about
directing Muslim lives. Rather, siyasa laws are created by the rulers of a society in order to
organize that society efficiently and safely.” 26
Additionally, in recognition of the fact that the religious aspects of Shari'a law are
debated and interpreted differently by various schools of thought within Islam, QuraishiLandes states that under proper Islamic governance, no religious ruling in a dispute is legally
binding unless the parties involved agree to take their complaint to the secular government. 27
“...A married couple following the Hanafi school would get a different answer about their legal
grounds for divorce than a couple who went to a Maliki legal scholar... the answer from the
Maliki or Hanafi legal scholar (called a fatwa) is not binding in itself...And this is done entirely
in the private realm. The only time a fiqh rule is imposed by the state is when the parties
cannot resolve their conflict with just a fatwa, and they seek out state-enforced resolution.”28
The secular government of Islamic countries under this dual system, while otherwise barred
from interfering in religious rulings (and vice versa) nonetheless must rely ultimately upon
Islam's holy text to form the basis of law. In a certain sense, the Qur'an, hadiths, and other holy
texts of the Islamic faith are to Quraishi-Landes' traditional Muslim government what the
Constitution is to the United States legal system; the writ basis on which legislation of every
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kind must reference and respect as the ultimate authority in lawmaking. As with the United
States Constitution, the Muslim holy texts referenced by Shari'a law are interpreted and
understood in many different ways, generating rival schools of thought that are as
fundamentally contentious as Originalists and Living Constitutionalists are in the realm of
American legal scholarship.
As quasi-legal actors in the extended civil justice system Shari'a courts and other
arbitration courts occupy a unique niche in political theory. While Federalism is generally
characterized by a sharing of power between state and local government entities, authorized
sources of third-party legal arbitration share a small part of that authority, and use it to serve
the legal disputes of a population that is not specifically linked to any kind of official
geographic jurisdiction. This has led to a novel paradigm whereby third-party arbitration
courts and religious tribunals, practically speaking, share in the larger equation of federalism,
with their rulings (if legal) being enforceable by the government, by virtue of the Arbitration
Act. While state and local courts serve a designated locality, and federal courts serve the
national government, arbitration courts are not bound to any specific political-geographic or
administrative locale, but rather serve individuals on a voluntary, contractual basis, sometimes
related to a belief system as in the case of Shari'a and other religious arbitration courts. As
government-sanctioned non-governmental players in the civil justice system, arbitration
courts, particularly religious arbitration courts, raise distinct questions about the role such
third-party authorities should play in American political-judicial procedure.

19

(ii.) Shari'a and Theories of Federalism.
While advocates of such non-territorial systems can point to the well-established
benefits to the official court system in the detouring of official cases to third-party entities,
there is a predictable uneasiness in some quarters regarding the implicit sharing of authority
with non-territorial entities, particular those associated with a system as distrusted and poorly
understood as Shari'a law, as demonstrated in the campaigns against Shari'a courts. On the
state government level, fear of Shari'a law's influence on judicial systems is reflected in the fact
that fears of state judges “consulting” Shari'a law in their decisions has resulted in thirty-four
states considering “foreign law” bans, with two dozen states having actually passed such
laws.29 This legislation serves as useful barometer of how many state governments may feel
about the sharing of legal authority with an alternate system of semi-legalistic values like
Shari'a law. Indeed, in the official state and federal courts, such legislation would appear
redundant, given the Establishment Clause's preexisting prohibition of religious teaching
being established as American law---a constitutional requirement which was applied to the
states under the Incorporation Doctrine in the twentieth century, rendering additional
legislative bans more of a symbolic gesture than an impactful law. However, while this
expression of displeasure is one that can be enacted within the context of the official system,
non-territorial third-party entities that have been introduced into the equation of American
federalism by the Arbitration Act are, for the time being, largely exempted from these
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legislative countermeasures. So long as the parties resorting to the third-party tribunals are
doing so of their own free will, and the rulings of the non-territorial tribunals are not
themselves in violation of federal or state law, their determinations stand with legal force.
II. Shari'a Law and Nation Case Studies
(i.) The United States.
Despite the precept of freedom of religion enshrined within Federal Law, and
longstanding acceptance of various kinds of religious arbitration courts, the issue has been no
less contentious in the United States than in the United Kingdom and other countries. In some
quarters, notably on the American political right, Islamic arbitration courts represent a special
case. While such observers regard longstanding Christian and Jewish arbitration courts as
permissible components of the fabric of the nation's traditional religious culture, they view the
introduction of Shari'a arbitration courts catering to the growing American Muslim community
as tantamount to intrusion by an alien religious presence. Such sentiments have led sixteen
U.S. States to ban judges from considering the precepts of Shari'a law in their rulings, in what
critics have called at best a pointless remedy to a non-existent threat, and at worst a
discriminatory exception to religious freedom. 30 Legal expert Michael Hefland states that,
ironically, the attempts at curbing the influence of Shari'a law in the U.S. are more often
worrying then the rulings of nearly any Islamic arbitration court. He points to the specific
example of Soleimani v. Soleimani, which saw an American Muslim woman bring her husband
to a Kansas state court in an attempt to extract a mahr (dowery) fee of $677,000 he had
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agreed to pay upon their marriage.
However, despite the fact that the husband's signature was presented on a written
contract agreeing to pay the dowry, the court ruled that the contract was invalid, citing a state
law which forbade the consideration of “foreign law” in court, effectively pronouncing Islam a
“foreign religion” and any contractual agreement signed according to the customs of Shari'a
null and void.31 Interestingly enough, though the plaintiff did not appeal the decision, she
could have arguably made a case that the Kansas state court had violated the Federal
Arbitration Act in its decision, since the Supreme Court established in Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co (1967) and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp (1983) that the protections to arbitration agreements instituted under the
Federal Arbitration Act is applicable in state and as Federal courts and the act does not, as
Justice Black had stated in his dissent in Prima, solely apply to arbitration agreements
pertaining to inter-state commerce, but to a wide variety of arbitration agreements.
Likewise, the Court's decision in Southland Corporation v. Keating (1984) determined
that due to the Supremacy Clause, state laws which contradicted arbitration agreements
protected by the Federal Arbitration Act would be superseded: “Looking to and interpreting
legislative history, the court stated that it was Congress' intent to create a substantive rule
under the Commerce Clause that would be applicable in state and federal courts, and would
preclude state laws that attempted to 'undercut' enforcement of arbitration agreements.”32 In
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the context of American politics, these cases create a risky dynamic for state legislators and
judges who oppose Shari'a arbitration courts in their rulings and policies. While the Shari'a
courts are highly controversial, as arbitrational courts, they are arguably protected by both
federal legislation and case law.
Given the inherently religious nature of Shari'a arbitration courts, and their obvious
interaction with the standard legal system, there are some inherent First Amendment concerns
that would not be present in a secular arbitration court. Indeed, it could be argued that the
legal system's enforcement of awards or penalties imposed by explicitly religious courts based
on religious doctrines presents a violation of the Establishment Clause. The answer to this
objection is complicated, given the unique relationship that has developed between religious
tribunals, and the secular justice system. In practice, for example, United States courts have
tended to enforce arbitration awards by religious tribunals, treating them like any other
arbitration case, focusing on the contract made rather than the topic it concerns, and thus
superficially avoiding the religious aspect of given cases altogether.33 Writing in the Boston
University Law Review, Michael Hefland notes, “when reviewing [religious] arbitration awards,
courts are tasked simply with ensuring that the arbitrators’ decision was issued pursuant to an
arbitration agreement between the parties and that the arbitrators complied with the
statutorily mandated procedural requirements.” 34 This, as Hefland notes, creates a peculiar
paradigm whereby United States courts, when faced with the case of an Imam who has been
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accused of preaching sermons that violated Islamic teaching, will refuse to hear the religious
case on Establishment Clause grounds---but will readily enforce the decision of a religious
arbitration court that imposes a financial penalty on the Imam for the same reason. 35
Insulating First Amendment concerns by focusing only on whether an arbitration
agreement was formed by the concerned parties, regardless of any religious content, has been
the standard procedure for courts faced with religious tribunals' decisions. This basic standard,
which is known as the Neutral Principles doctrine, was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Jones
vs. Wolf (1979). In Jones, the Court noted that though it could not directly interfere with
religious doctrines and practices due to the First Amendment, it was perfectly entitled to
adjudicate in disputes where legally agreed-upon rules, contracts, or bylaws of an
organization had been violated. “The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach
are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate nearly
all structures of religious organization and administration.. The method relies exclusively on
objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It
thereby promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious
doctrine, administration, and practice.”36 Here again, the standard legal procedure for
addressing the violation of agreements involving religion has typically adopted the tactic of
focusing on whether an agreement was in fact made, and more or less ignoring the religious
context it was made in. For this reason, Shari'a arbitration courts are fairly unlikely to run afoul
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of the First Amendment.
ii.) Canada
In Canada, the debate over Shari'a arbitration courts is colored by a different
understanding of religious freedom. As in the United States, Canada has not seen any
overriding ban on Shari'a law on the national level, but has seen strong opposition and some
regional bans on the application of Shari'a law, even if the manner in which Shari'a rulings are
applied arguably conforms to Canadian law. The debate reached particular prominence in the
Province of Ontario in 2004 when Toronto lawyer and Muslim community organizer Syed
Mumtaz Ali announced that an organization dubbed the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice would
begin dispensing arbitrational rulings on civil disputes and family law based on the principles
of Shari'a law.
Over the next twenty months, the debate over the proper limits of religious freedom
and secular neutrality within Canadian legal practice would continue unabated, with the
supporters of the arbitration courts facing organized opposition by some women's groups, 37
who repeated the oft-cited argument alleging that Shari'a law stripped women of their rights,
and that the families of some Muslim women might pressure them to use Islamic tribunals.
The issue was eventually resolved by an all-encompassing ban on alternative arbitration
tribunals that made decisions based on anything other than Ontario or national law,
effectively outlawing religious tribunals of all varieties, including Christian and Jewish
arbitration courts that had operated without controversy since 1991. While some other
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religious groups were upset by the bans, Islamic organizations had particular cause for
consternation, as the bans, though universal to religious arbitration tribunals, came into being
when the potential for Islamic arbitration courts in Ontario became a realistic possibility.
Indeed, the concern over the establishment of Shari'a arbitration courts in Ontario, and
the ensuing controversy, ultimately superseded the original rationale for permitting the
arbitration courts in the first place. The court system of Ontario, like many regional and
national courts across the Western world, was suffering from a high degree of backlog as the
justice and arbitration system struggled to serve the demands of an unprecedentedly large
population.38 The formalization of religious arbitration courts in 1991 was intended to redirect
specific varieties of civil disputes away from the normal court system, thereby alleviating a
portion of the justice system's case-load.39 The elimination of all religious arbitration courts in
the province, therefore, demonstrates that some Ontarians would prefer to forego the benefits
that religious tribunals of all varieties provide for the larger court system than permit the
establishment of Shari’a tribunals in their province. The comparative lack of controversy
surrounding religious arbitration tribunals prior to the proposed establishment of Shari'a
courts demonstrates that Shari'a itself is likely the point of controversy. As in the United
Kingdom and the United States, the suppression of Shari'a law in Ontario raises the question
of if, and to what degree, anti-Islamic sentiment influences the movement against Shari'a
arbitration courts, and whether such opposition represents a reaction to the specific content
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of Shari'a tribunal rulings, or if systemic societal bias against Islam is the chief motivating
factor, given the general tolerance of and lack of opposition to other arbitration courts that
lack religious influence.
III. The Source of Radicalism: Faith or Politics?
(i.) The Importance of Politics in Shaping Religious Practice
Apart from the sentiments towards Shari'a prevailing within Western countries hosting
significant Muslim immigrant populations, another front on the debate between Islamic
thought and Western conceptions of law extends within the Islamic community itself. The
Islamic community in the West presents a paradoxical dichotomy between fully acclimated
and educated Muslim citizens who are highly accepting of the democratic legal thought
prevailing in their country, and those immigrants who have arrived more recently, perhaps
from a less rigorously educated background, who view Western conception of law with
varying degrees of wariness, fearing bias or erasure of their own cultural identity. 40
Additionally, the rapid modernization of some Muslim immigrants' countries of origin has
resulted in a contemporary paradigm where Muslim immigrants from these countries embrace
far more traditional attitudes than their co-religionists from more developed areas of the
Islamic world; Muslim immigrants hailing from post-colonialist nations where local application
of democratic theory is in its infancy may be more suspicious of such political philosophies.
It would be remiss to overlook the practical status of the development democratic
governments throughout much of the Islamic World. Historically, the Islamic world has been

40

Hashemi, Nader. Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy..
27

comparatively slow to transition from pre-democratic forms of government, and the
hegemony of militaristic autocrats and traditional monarchies remained largely unquestioned
until the wave of Arab Spring Revolutions beginning in 2011. Of the six absolute monarchies
extant in the modern era, (Vatican City, Brunei, Swaziland, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar and
the United Arab Emirates) five are Islamic majority nations. 41 It is also noteworthy that certain
other Islamic states embrace variations of monarchical or stratocratic government systems
which largely preclude the populace's participation in the legislative process. Iran, for instance,
operates as a constitutional theocracy, where Islamic scholars oversee much of the legislative
process.
Another symptom of the ways the Islamic world has trailed behind its peers in the West
in terms of democratic development is the comparative prevalence of draconian and
archaic laws in certain Islamic nations. In Indonesia, for instance, regional laws criminalize
homosexuality and specify a penalty of one hundred lashes, 42 while in Yemen, Mauritania,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Sudan, and some regions of Somalia, homosexual acts carry the death
penalty. Qatar imposes the death penalty on heterosexual couples who engage in
premarital sex, and in many conservative countries within the Islamic world, public displays of
affection such as kissing and holding hands can result in fines, imprisonment, and other civil
penalties. Indonesia specifies that "passionate" kissing in public can be punished with up to
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five years in prison,43 while the United Arab Emirates deports foreign expatriates guilty of lewd
behavior.44 Even some highly advanced and wealthy first-world nations within the Islamic
world cling to severe legal standards that have been discarded in many other regions of the
world. In Saudi Arabia, the death penalty can be inflicted for certain non-violent offenses such
as the sale and smuggling of illegal narcotics, as well as for homosexuality. Indeed, the human
rights organization Amnesty International recorded 151 instances where executions were
sentenced and carried out in the Saudi justice system in 2015, compared to 35 instances in the
United States in the same year.
Even more controversially, Amnesty International notes that certain ideological and
religious offenses are theoretically punishable with the death penalty within the Saudi
Kingdom, including blasphemy, apostasy, homosexuality, and adultery. In 2008, Saudi Arabian
authorities made international headlines with their arrest of Ali Hussian Sibat, a popular
Lebanese-born talk show host known for predicting the fortunes of listeners who called his
program.45 Sibat was convicted on charges of sorcery and sentenced to death by beheading in
a trial unusual in the context of a first-world country in the 21st century. Under international
pressure, the Saudi Supreme Court overturned the sentence and released Sibat in 2010. 46
Amnesty International notes that Saudi authorities continue to prosecute dozens of
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individuals for sorcery every year, with the last reported execution for sorcery occurring in
2007, when Egyptian-born pharmacist Mustafa Ibrahim was convicted and beheaded for
desecrating a Qur'an and allegedly practicing witchcraft. 47 For a variety of charges, capital
punishment within Saudi Arabia is routinely performed through traditional and anachronistic
methods, including firing squads and beheading, and occasionally stoning and crucifixion for
certain religious and ideological offenses.48
The development of women's rights within much of the Islamic world varies from nation
to nation, with highly conservative Muslim-majority states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran
presenting a comparable deficit in women's rights, with required male guardianship in public,
a strictly enforced Islamic dress code, inability to travel without the consent of male guardians,
and comparatively limited rights to marry the partner of their choice, or obtain a divorce.49 In
contrast, more liberal Muslim-majority nations such as Turkey have historically afforded
women with most of the legal rights enjoyed by their peers in the West. 50 In Iran, along with
less developed Islamic nations such as Yemen, child marriages remain theoretically enshrined
in the law, though in practice it is uncommon in Iran.
While the status of democratic rights within the traditionally-defined Islamic world may
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offer some insight into the context from which many recent Islamic immigrants to Western
democracies derive their cultural perspectives, it is not a perfect metric for determining the
compatibility between Shari'a forms of legal thought and Western forms of law within the
realm of arbitration, given that each state within the Islamic world has a historical and socialpolitical context outside of Shari'a law that impacts the interpretations offered by religious
scholars in the region. In this sense, it may be argued that those state within the Islamic world
that support undemocratic or archaic policies have hijacked the legitimacy of Shari'a law
within the Islamic world to prop up their own political customs and power structure. Indeed,
states such as Saudi Arabia have been accused of assuming a mantle of religious piety for
secular political ends, and persecuting the regime's political opponents with an interpretation
of Shari'a law that permits it to condemn political enemies of the regime as violators of
religious law. Vague charges of affronting Islam and “adopting a takfiri (heretical) approach to
religion, contrary to the Sunnah and Qur'an” have been used as a justification to silence the
ruling House of Saud's critics within both political and religious circles in the kingdom.
The rulings of mufti are, in this sense, often used to justify repressive policies, and
maintain the political and religious status quo. Fundamentalist mufti arguably form symbiotic
relationships with autocratic governments; government regimes grant legal force to the
rulings of religious scholars, who in turn imbue a theological varnish to the policies of the
regime. Due to this religious-political dynamic, opposition groups who represent a threat to
the political legitimacy of the regime often face double charges of criminal misconduct and
heresy. One of the most notorious examples of this trend occurred in January of 2016, when
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forty-seven Saudi activists led by popular Islamic religious leader and liberal pro-democracy
activist Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr were convicted on charges of terrorism and religious
unorthodoxy and sentenced to death following a string of peaceful protests against the
autocratic governments of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Syria.51 Al-Nimr and his followers
advocated for a peaceful transition to more democratic systems of government in the Middle
East, and an increase in human rights, and furthermore suggested that portions of the Saudi
Kingdom should secede if these ideals were not respected. Citing al-Nimr's supposed violation
of the kingdom's religious laws and denouncing his movement as terrorism, the Saudi regime
argued that the mass-execution was justified under Islamic principles, while other observers
criticized the move as a transparent hijacking of Shari'a law to dispose of the regime's political
opponents.52
Similarly, Iran, Qatar, Yemen, Pakistan and other Islamic states arguably take full
advantage of the highly elastic and subjective nature of Shari'a law in order to grant religious
legitimacy to laws considered to fall below the standard of democratic human rights. It is
arguable that the manner in which Shari'a is interpreted in certain Islamic nations most
frequently falls into line with the political interests of the ruling regime, and is typically tailored
to lend autocratic regimes an artificially inflated legitimacy in an age when such governmental
structures are considered outmoded in much of the world. In this sense, the manner in which
Shari'a is executed within the context of the Islamic world is arguably a poor test of whether it
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is compatible with Western forms of law, or how Muslim scholars in the context of Western
Shari'a arbitration courts might interpret religious texts when removed from the context of
autocratic and monarchical regimes as exist in certain parts of the Islamic world.
Furthermore, analyzing the manner in which democracy has exhibited a comparatively
slow level of growth in the Islamic world, it is likewise necessary to factor in the demise or
upset of numerous longstanding autocratic governmental structures in the Arab Spring
Revolutions beginning in 2011. Upheavals within much of Islamic society saw the end of
autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and threatened the survival of others, notably Syria,
which has endured five years of civil war as opposition forces seek to dissolve the government
of Basshar al-Assad. While it avoided outright revolution, Saudi Arabia likewise experienced a
number of protests in 2011-2012, which saw the deaths of several activists at the hands of the
authorities, but ultimately did not seriously damage the regime's authority.
While the waves of protests, revolts, and regime terminations prevailing over much of
the Middle East and North Africa presented a profound reshaping of the political climate
within certain Islamic countries, they also saw changes in the way Shari'a rulings were
constructed and executed, as religious scholars supportive of fallen autocratic regimes
increasingly lost influence. In Libya, the fall of Muamar Gaddafi's regime saw the rise of new
interpretations of Sharia law comparatively more favorable towards democracy, clashing with
the work of scholars of more conservative readings which had prevailed prior to the revolution
of 2011.53 After Gaddafi's regime was dissolved in 2011, the National Transitional Council led
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by Mustafa Abdel Jalil announced that the new government would use Shari'a as a source for
its constitution, leading to some concerns among Western observers about the fortunes of
democracy in a post-Gaddafi Libya, with some pointing to repressive states such as Saudi
Arabia as functional examples of how Shari'a is executed in practice. However, as previously
stated, the manner in which Shari'a is practiced in Saudi Arabia is the political result of one of
many potential scholarly interpretations of Islamic religious texts---and paradoxically, the
repressive political climate of Saudi Arabia is likely a key influence in promoting those
interpretations, in a manner that permits the regime to draw upon the cultural legitimacy of
Islamic theology to maintain the social status quo and stifle political opposition. In the
question of whether or not Shari'a law can be consonant with the principles of Western-style
constitutional democracy, it is necessary to address how a religious form of law like Shari'a
could coexist with the purely secular and religiously neutral form of government prevailing in
most Western nations.
Likewise, while it is demonstrable that some of the autocracies claiming Islam as a
source of legitimacy are not above discarding its more inconvenient traditions in the name of
political expediency, it is necessary to address the nature of Shari'a's minimum role within
society, given the relatively high number of those autocratic regimes claiming it as an
inspiration in their policies. Fethulah Gülen asserts that while there are some observers both
within and outside of the Islamic community who regard Shari'a as a primarily political aspect
of Islamic teaching, these observers are mistaken, arguing that any interpretation of Shari'a is
primarily a standard for Muslims to live by in their own religious lives, and it is not designed to
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supersede or replace secular laws imposed by the greater society. He points out that Islamic
societies down through history have relied upon secular government apparatuses to form and
execute laws---even in the case of heavily theocratic states such as Saudi Arabia, which claim
inspiration from Shari'a in its government's policies. “In Islam, the legislative and executive
institutions have always been allowed to make laws. These are based on the needs and
betterment of society and within the frame of general norms of law...Muslims have always
developed laws. The community members are required to obey the laws that one can identify
as “higher principles” as well as laws made by humans.”54
He furthermore argues that any government that permits Muslims to reasonably
practice their faith without interference is sufficient to compel Muslims to obey its laws.
Muslims are by no means obliged to replace functional secular laws with theocratic ones,
especially if their religious freedom receives greater protection in the context of a secular
constitutional democracy. Gülen concludes: “In the presence of such a state, there is no need
to seek an alternative state...In order to make such ideal laws, lawmakers should reform, renew,
and organize the system according to the universal norms of law. Even if such a renewal is not
considered tashri’i (based on Shari'a), it is not conceived of as being against it.” 55 In principle,
therefore, it is arguable that not every form of Shari'a necessarily promotes nondemocratic
thought, even if Shari'a interpretations prevailing within theocratic autocracies tend to affirm
the policies of those regimes---and, as previously stated, the dominance of autocratic regimes
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and their influence on the development of Islamic legal thought may tend to artificially bolster
theocratic mufti by suppressing others who refuse to cooperate with the regime.
Another dynamic at play within the Islamic world, as previously intimated, is the legacy
of colonialism, and the perception that democracy is a product of the secular West which is
hostile the values indigenous cultures of the region. In many areas of the Islamic world,
Muslim advocates of democracy are faced with the challenge of contending against the
historical cultural memory of past experiences with democratic societies, which, unfortunately,
have not always been positive. Due to competing political interests, Western democracies
have, at times, contributed to the negative political dynamics prevailing in many parts of the
Islamic world today. This has in turn contributed to a kind of besieged attitude in some parts
of the Islamic world, which tends to further bolster the legitimacy of self-proclaimedly
“Islamic” autocratic regimes, which can capitalize upon this negative historical legacy to
demonize pro-democracy Islamic thinkers as cultural traitors. In order to understand all
aspects of the Islamic world's relationship with democratic thought, it is necessary to
understand these historical events and their impact on the perception of democratic ideals in
some key Muslim-majority nations.
(ii.) The Impact of Historical Politics on Islamic Perceptions of Democracy
One of the most notorious and far-reaching examples of how political interactions with
Western democracies has contributed to negative perceptions of democracy in some quarters
of the Islamic world is found in the events leading up to the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.
Over the first half of the twentieth century, Iran experienced a whirlwind cultural and political
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movement in favor of Westernization that brought the absolutist power of the Qajar
Monarchy to an abrupt end, replacing it with a constitutional monarchy under Reza Shah in
1925.56 In 1941, United Kingdom and USSR invaded Iran, following accusations that Shah's
government was colluding with the Axis powers, despite Iran's declaration of neutrality.
Ultimately, the British obliged Shah to abdicate in favor of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in
1941. Additionally, Iran entered into an arrangement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (a
precursor to the modern British Petroleum Company) which was seen by many Iranians to
overwhelmingly favor the British, who were likewise perceived to be using the oil company's
assets in influence Iranian politics. Growing dissatisfaction with the constitutional monarchy's
policies led to the rise of the Iranian National Front, which sought to transform Iran into a fullfledged democratic republic.
The election of National Front candidate Mohammad Mosaddegh to the office of Prime
Minister of Iran in 1951 saw the introduction of wide variety of Western-inspired liberalization
measures, including labor protection laws, the construction of Western-style universities and
infrastructure, and a wide variety of other development projects aimed at realizing the
National Front's vision of transforming Iran into a modern republic. 57 His most controversial
project was the proposed nationalization of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's assets, which
would placed Iran's fossil-fuel resources under the control of the Iranian government, and
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beyond the reach of the British economy, which had benefited immensely under the previous
agreement. In direct response to this event, the United Kingdom established itself as a strong
opponent to the ascendant democratic movement within Iran. Likewise, the United States
government, concerned that Iran had remained neutral in the Cold War standoff between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, perceived the democratic faction of Iran as a potential
threat to U.S. interests in the region, particularly if they potentially chose to support the Soviet
bloc.58 This fear was heightened to an ever greater degree when Mossadegh's government, in
the face of British oil embargoes sending the Iranian economy into a state of near-collapse,
successfully passed a referendum dissolving parliament and stripping the Shah of his
remaining powers.
Accordingly, the CIA and MI6 colluded to overthrow the elected members of the
Iranian government, and quash the Iranian democratic faction before it achieve its goals of
appropriating Iran's natural resources for the country's own use. The operation, known by the
codename Operation Ajax, not only sought to interfere with the Iranian electoral process by
bribing local officials, but also manufacture civil unrest and violence to undermine the
authority of Mossadegh's government. Ultimately, Operation Ajax culminated in a full-fledged
coup d'etat which saw Mossedagh arrested by Iranian monarchist and army General Fazlollah
Zahedi, and the Shah's full powers being restored against the will of much of the country.
Over the next three decades, the Shah's near-absolutist reign would be dogged by
economic problems, accusations of brutality by his subjects, and the indelible stigma of being
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an autocratic leader propped up by Western democracies. His restoration of Britain's
considerable fossil-fuel privileges on Iranian soil likewise won him the further disdain of
Iranian democrats and nationalists alike. Ultimately, Shah Pahlevi's dictatorial approach to
modernization and secularization caused the galvanization of a nascent political faction of
religious fundamentalists in Iran, and his lack of support from fellow secularists embittered by
his Western-backed autocratic rule precipitated the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which
instituted the theocratic government ruling Iran today. In 2013, CIA documents declassified
under the Freedom of Information Act belatedly acknowledged the United States' intimate
involvement in the Iranian coup of 1953,59 confirming the long-held accusations of Iranian
political historians that the United States had played a key role in orchestrating the
extinguishment of the democratic movement of Iran--a suspicion which had, unsurprisingly,
caused many Muslims in the region to lose faith in Western forms of democratic government.
Another major area of diplomatic abrasion between Middle-Eastern Muslims and the
United States' foreign policy is the consistent support the United States has shown to Saudi
Arabia's House of Saud. Indeed, economic interactions between the United States and the
House of Saud in the 1930s arguably enabled the family to become power-brokers in the
modern world, transforming them from an aristocratic but largely destitute Arab family whose
fortunes were in apparent decline by the twentieth century, into an anachronistic but
fantastically wealthy medieval-style Islamic monarchy before the dawn of the twenty-first
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century. The arrival of American oil surveyors in the region in the early 1930s was a pivotal
event in the history of the Islamic world; while part of the region now known as Saudi Arabia
had long held religious significance as the location of the holy city of Mecca, the area had,
until the 20th century, been something of a political backwater on the fringe of the Ottoman
Empire.
The discovery of Saudi Arabia's massive oil reserves by the American surveyors and the
subsequent foundation of the Arab-American Company (ARAMCO) established the unlikely
but enduring partnership between the United States and the Saudi Kingdom, which, over the
course of the century, accrued unbelievable wealth due to the oil trade, enabling the Saudi
monarchy to garner favor with its people by abolishing taxation. Additionally, the United
States has consistently sold modern weaponry to the Saudi Kingdom, with the Obama
administration offering to sell a total of $115 billion in advanced tanks, aircraft, and other
military hardware to the monarchy over the course of President Obama's two terms in office.
Additionally, both the Obama and Trump administrations have offered logistical and strategic
support to Saudi Arabia's controversial war in the neighboring state of Yemen, which, though
widely criticized as a pointless struggle that has caused a major humanitarian crisis in the
region, is reflective of a long pattern of political and militaristic aid that the United States has
offered its ally and oil trading partner.60
The reasons that the United States' relationship with Saudi Arabia present a myriad of
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problems for the perception of democracy in the region are as multi-faceted as they are
unique to the politics of the region. The royal family of Saudi Arabia, while managing to
maintain power into the modern era through the oil trade, nonetheless bears the dubious
distinction of being despised by secularists, religious moderates, advocates of democracy, and
radical fundamentalists alike across the Middle East, a near-unanimous hatred which colors
much of the Islamic world's perception of the United States. The House of Saud has earned
the ire of democratic reformers in the Islamic world, who loathe the regime's anachronistic
governmental structures, which in the typical style of a feudal monarchy places members of
the Saud clan in most important offices of government. 61 Religious moderates in the Islamic
world detest the brutality of the Saud regime, and the executions of peaceful Muslim
dissidents such as the late Shiekh Nimr al-Nimr, who, as previously stated, was beheaded with
forty-six of his fellow activists for speaking against the policies of the Saudi government.
Secularists oppose the Saudi government's theocratic policies, its alliance with the militant
Wahabist sect, and its persecution of atheists such as Raif Badawi, a Saudi blogger who in
2016 was sentenced to ten years in prison and 2,000 lashes for tweets deemed blasphemous
by Saudi athorities.62
Most peculiarly, the Saudi royal family has made innumerable enemies among many if
not most radical fundamentalists outside of the Wahabist sect. Non-Wahabist fundamentalists

61

62

Usborne, David. Isolated abroad, hated at home: House of Saud faces uncertain future. The
Independent. May 31st, 2004
Burke, David. Saudi Arabian man is jailed for 10 years and given 2,000 lashes for tweeting that he is
an atheist and criticising religion. September 1st, 2016.
41

often regard the supposed religiosity of the regime as a hypocritical front, and harbor a long
list of grievances against the House of Saud. The fundamentalists point to the lavish
Westernized lifestyles enjoyed by the Saudi oil-aristocracy, the numerous sex scandals that
have rocked the sprawling royal family over the years, and the materialism and plutocracy that
characterizes much of the government. Fundamentalists also object to the Saudi government's
toleration of non-Muslims on the sacred ground where the Prophet Muhammed lived and
preached, and were particularly outraged by the presence of non-Muslim military personnel
on Saudi soil during the Gulf War, which they regarded as a profanation of holy ground. 63
Despised and beset on all sides by disparate ideological groups, and economically challenged
by recent fluctuations in oil prices, the House of Saud can count few allies in the arena of
world politics as influential as the United States---to the detriment of the United States' image
in the region. Writing for the Atlantic newspaper, former CIA field director Robert Baer
summed up the situation faced by the United States' monarchical Arab ally: “Saudi oil is
controlled by an increasingly bankrupt, criminal, dysfunctional, and out-of-touch royal family
that is hated by the people it rules and by the nations that surround its kingdom." 64
Given the widespread disdain for the Saudi royal family from most ideological quarters
of the Middle East, it is perhaps unsurprising that the United States' diplomatic and economic
relationship with the monarchy reflects badly on the image of the democratic values that the
United States symbolically represents on the world stage. Even to religious moderates and
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advocates of democracy in the region, the United States' alliance with the feudal regime
presents a frustrating dilemma, as it undermines faith in the values of the democratic
governments of the West that are offering support to a brutal, despised, and anachronistic
monarchy in the Middle East. International organizations such as the United Nations have in
recent years also contributed to the growing doubts of some quarters of the Islamic world in
the veracity of democratic values, which, in the context of international politics, may
sometimes appear to be a moral fig-leaf for the ambitions of self-interested nations. In
October of 2016, for example, while the Russian Federation's representatives were effectively
kicked out of the United Nations Human Rights Council over the country's annexation of
Crimea and subsequent support for rebel factions in Ukraine, Saudi Arabia was re-elected to
the same UN human rights council, this following a controversy in September 2015 which saw
one of Saudi Arabia's representatives being appointed as the chairman of a panel that selects
independent human rights experts.65 The Saudi Kingdom's re-election to the human rights
council occurred despite the aforementioned mass-execution of peaceful pro-democracy
activists at the start of the year, the consistent regressive persecutions of Islamic moderates,
atheists, homosexuals, alleged “sorcerers”, etc., and the deaths of Yemeni civilians in the
kingdom's ongoing war in that country. In the face of this, organizations such as the United
Nations, which claims democracy as one its “core values and principles” 66 have in their way
served to further erode the confidence many Middle Eastern Muslims have in Western ideals
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of democracy, negatively impacting the growth of democratic values in an Islamic world that
witnesses Western democracy legitimizing and supporting a regional monarchy against the
will of the inhabitants.
(iii.) Does Shari'a or Politics Promote Fundamentalist Thought?
In light of the clear regressive policies of certain regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Iran,
it has been argued in certain quarters that Islam, Shari'a law, or both inevitably promote these
forms of fundamentalist thinking. However, it is arguable that the form of Shari'a law, and the
manner in which the Islamic faith is practiced, is more heavily influenced by the broader
political context in which they exist. Governments, law systems, or non-territorial federal
systems influenced by Shari'a law that exist within a more moderate or liberal political context,
will, arguably, exhibit a proportionally moderate tone in many cases. As previously stated, the
greater freedom of expression and religious conscience afforded in secular-democratic
nations tends to stimulate the growth of different perspectives towards Muslim philosophy
that would not be permitted to exist in many of the aforementioned autocratic regimes.
Indeed, without the heavy administrative hand of a quasi-theocratic government that relies
upon a specific narrative of the Islamic religion to promote its own legitimacy, the tradition of
ijtihād typically produces a myriad of traditions, philosophies, and expressions of Islamic
thought.
Whereas the Saudi Arabian government enforces an extremely narrow range of Islamic
philosophical belief, and tends to suppress liberal thought, democratic sentiment, and
alternative perceptions of religion, Islamic communities within the West, when free of such
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constraints, can fall into either the left or right of the political and social spectrum. As Dr. Kecia
Ali of Boston University notes in the opening chapter of Sexual Ethics And Islam: Feminist
Reflections on Qur'an, Hadith, and Jurisprudence, “The spectrum of Muslim engagements with
interlocutors both Muslim and non-Muslim is vast...There is no one Muslim perspective on
anything. Even among madrassa-educated scholars...one finds a spectrum of views ranging
from enlightened to obscurantist.67” This paradigm of how the Islamic faith is practiced when
freed of the arguably artificial mitigating factors created by the unique political dynamics of
the traditionally-defined Islamic world raises a question of to what degree the apparent
opposition to liberal values is actually a product of the Islamic faith, and to what degree it is
generated by the specific modern political context of the region. It should be noted that large
portions of the Islamic world had, in prior eras, a social dynamic that was extremely different
than exists in much of the Islamic world today and an interpretation of Shari'a law that is more
in keeping with modern liberal values.
It is arguable that the current lag in the development of liberal thought in the modern
Islamic world, and the fundamentalism that is so stereotypical of some modern Islamic states
such as Saudi Arabia represents only a negative extreme of the form that t a Shari'a system
may take. During the Golden Age of Islam, (circa 780-1260 CE), many regions of the Islamic
world, operating under their respective understandings of the Shari'a law tradition, were
notable for their comparatively high degree of tolerance and what might be considered more
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liberal thought, certainly compared to their non-Islamic peers of the era, but to a certain
extent, also some of their counterparts in the Islamic world of today. The Fatimid Empire,
which stretched from southern Spain to North Africa and the Middle East, was one of the few
societies of the era to allow for a degree of freedom of expression and religion, with
Christians, Jews, and others being free to practice their faith under the Fatimid reading of
Shari'a law.68
Likewise, during this period of Islamic history, to facilitate the practice of debate under
the tradition of ijtihād, scholars and philosophers with diverse philosophies and viewpoints
were subsidized by the Fatimid government, along with translators who recovered and
preserved the works of pagan philosophers from Greece, Rome, and other earlier civilizations,
storing them in a large library in Baghdad. 69 This stands in stark contrast to the practices of
some authoritarian regimes and organizations in certain areas of the modern Islamic world,
which attempt to preserve their own political and ideological legitimacy by iconoclastically
attacking and suppressing the achievements of earlier cultures, most notoriously
demonstrated by the Taliban's demolition of ancient Buddhist statues in Afghanistan in 2001. 70
Due to the comparatively high level of freedom of expression and thought, the Golden
Age of Islam produced varying perspectives and theories about how the Islamic faith is most
appropriately practiced, frequently with the emphasis on the acquisition of scientific and
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philosophical knowledge that characterized much of Islamic culture. Indeed, the emphasis on
a narrow understanding of Islamic orthodoxy that characterizes the practice of Shari'a in some
modern regimes like Saudi Arabia was notably absent from Islamic philosophical practice of
the Golden Age era, and some of the myriad of religious theories even incorporated
farsighted scientific ideas that would not debut in modern Western science until the after
industrial Revolution and would certainly be condemned as heterodox by certain Islamic
regimes today. For instance, Islamic Golden-Age thinker and theological commentator Ibn
Khaldun (1332-1406), writing in his famous work the Muqaddimah some 432 years before the
birth of Charles Darwin, theorized that humans evolved from lower primates in an incremental
divine plan:
One should then take a look at the world of creation. It started out from the
minerals and progressed, in an ingenious, gradual manner, to plants and
animals...The last stage of plants, such as palms and vines, is connected with the
first stage of animals, such as snails and shellfish...The animal world then widens,
its species become numerous, and, in a gradual process of creation, it finally
leads to man, who is able to think and reflect. The higher stage of man is
reached from the world of monkeys.71
This example serves to emphasize the radical differences in freedom of thought, expression,
and belief that is possible under more liberal readings of Shari'a. Far from the dogmatic
suppression of alternative theological thought so characteristic of Shari'a law in regimes such
as Saudi Arabia, some historical Islamic societies operating under the tradition of ijtihād gave
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rise to alternative understandings of Islamic thought, facilitated by a degree of free expression
that was not generally characteristic of the era.
Ultimately, while some contemporary Islamic fundamentalists indisputably cite Shari'a
law as a justification for violence and the abuse of human rights, the historical record attests
to the fact that these circumstances are not inevitable in Islamic societies. In an Islamic society
where members of the faith are permitted to participate in the tradition of debate and
discussion of Muslim theological thought, it may be expected that a wider diversity of
religious interpretations and perspectives will arise, and, if the philosophical tradition is
observed, coexist. While fundamentalism is a phenomenon that occurs within religions and
religious societies, the broader political context is a major deciding factor on the
predominance of fundamentalist religious perspectives in certain areas; that is, political
structures may deliberately encourage and nurture the growth of certain radical religious
perspectives, if, as previously stated, it serves the purpose of that regime.
Indeed, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the connection between the notoriously decadent
House of Saud and the austere followers of the Wahhabi sect was not coincidental. Their
alliance is a political one that dates back to the mid-1700s, when the Saud clan formed an
agreement with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi sect, whereby
he agreed to imbue their territorial ambitions with the theological legitimacy of his sect, and
they in return would provide the Wahhabi sect with a political power base and social
influence;72 the three-century old symbiotic relationship between the Saudi royal family and
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the Wahhabists provides an archetypical example of how a fundamentalist religious sect can
be propped up by the government. In return, as previously mentioned, the Wahhabist mufti
continue to lend a certain theological legitimacy to the House of Saud, while they also
generally choose to tolerate the decadence and materialism which has caused other
fundamentalists to turn against the Saudi royal family. While the values of the political regime
and the predominant fundamentalist sect are thoroughly at odds with one another, members
of both groups choose to overlook this discrepancy in the name of deriving a mutual benefit.
In societies where the government does not rely upon a specific faith or sect to
establish its legitimacy, fundamentalists are arguably less likely to take hold in the manner as
the Wahhabists have in Saudi Arabia, and impose their own specific interpretation of the
Shari'a law tradition. Ultimately, then, it appears that Islam or Shari'a themselves are not the
chief causes of the growth of fundamentalism, but, as previously argued, it is political
structures that lack inherent legitimacy that attempt to manufacture it through the promotion
of fundamentalism, drawing upon autocratic understandings of Shari'a that serve to underpin
their autocratic political practices. Furthermore, this offers broader implications for the
relationship between religion and the state---when not interfered with to by the interest of a
state that lacks inherent legitimacy, Shari'a, and possibly other religious traditions as well, tend
to conform within the moderate spectrum of the political context they exist within.
VI: Conclusions
(i). Future Prospects for Shari'a in the West.

February 2007).
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Given the current political dynamics and numerous ongoing political crises involving
the Islamic world, the future of Shari'a in Western democracies is mixed. In Canada, if the
elimination of religious courts in Ontario precipitates a general ban in the coming years,
Shari'a courts in that nation may see an abrupt end. In any case, the example of Ontario
demonstrated that the prospects of Shari'a in Canada may be bleaker than elsewhere in the
West. Likewise, the rise of nationalist sentiment in the United Kingdom, combined with Brexit,
may pose a challenge to the existence of Shari'a tribunals, as campaigns against them
continue; unlike in Canada, however, there are few indicators in the United Kingdom of an
immediate legal threat to the continued operation of Shari'a courts.
In the United States, the state legislatures of many states have voiced their displeasure
to the presence of Shari'a in any context of the legal system by passing laws attempting to
ban foreign or religious law from state courtrooms. However, courtrooms relying upon the
legal doctrine of neutral principles tend to sidestep First Amendment concerns by focusing on
the contractual aspects of religious arbitration agreements, treating them like any other
agreements. Furthermore, the two pronged legitimacy offered by case law and the Federal
Arbitration Act would appear to indicate that arbitration courts, Shari'a courts included, are
likely to be a part of the U.S. legal landscape for years to come.
(ii) Broader Implications
The conclusions reached over the course of this project raise a number of further
questions regarding the interaction between religion and politics. Most saliently, while it
appears that Islamic religious practice, in general, is greatly shaped and impacted by the
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research of this project is somewhat limited at this juncture by focusing on the Islamic faith
alone, as per its objective of analyzing whether or not Shari'a arbitration courts are consonant
with democratic principles. A more comprehensive analysis of this paradigm between religion
and politics would require an examination of other faiths in their respective political contexts.
However, assuming that the relationship between Islamic conceptions of law and the values of
the government it exists in holds true across other faiths, a hypothesis could be advanced that
widespread religious radicalism of any variety could be prevented through political
moderation.
(iii). Are Shari'a Courts Compatible with Secular Democracies?
Taking into consideration the wide diversity of religious perspectives falling under the
umbrella of Shari'a law in the Islamic faith, and the legal traditions of the Western nations
examined, Shari'a courts are arguably compatible with secular constitutional democracies,
provided that they receive the proper oversight due to all arbitration courts to ensure their
rulings are in accordance with the laws of the nation they operate in, and the parties whose
cases are heard in the Shari'a court are recoursing to it of their own free will. Historical
examples and modern diversity of thought within Islam demonstrate that fundamentalist
values are not inevitable within Shari'a systems, and that those existing within more moderate
political contexts tend to show more diversity of thought and ideological moderation than
those existing in more extremist political contexts. Shari'a arbitration courts, if properly
monitored by the authorities, should present few difficulties to a secular democratic system.
Where the flexible religious system that is Shari'a law exists in a moderate democratic political
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context, it is likely to conform more to that political system than impact it.
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